Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-627
Authors: Anderson, Michael L.
Title: Of Bayes and bullets : an embodied, situated, targeting-based account of predictive processing
Online publication date: 1-Jun-2017
Language : english
Abstract: Here I argue that Jakob Hohwy’s (Hohwy 2013) cognitivist interpretation of predictive processing (a) does not necessarily follow from the evidence for the importance of Bayesian processing in the brain; (b) is rooted in a misunderstanding of our epistemic position in the world; and (c) is undesirable in that it leads to epistemic internalism or idealism. My claim is that the internalist/idealist conclusions do not follow from predictive processing itself, but instead from the model of perception Hohwy’s adopts, and that there are alternate models of perception that do not lend themselves to idealist conclusions. The position I advocate is similar to Andy Clark’s embodied/embedded interpretation of Bayesian processing (Clark 2015); however, I argue that Clark’s position, as currently stated, also potentially leads to idealist conclusions. I offer a specific emendation to Clark’s view that I believe avoids this pitfall.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-627
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Philosophy and predictive processing
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: 60
73
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2017
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573055
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