Of Bayes and bullets : an embodied, situated, targeting-based account of predictive processing

Abstract

Here I argue that Jakob Hohwy’s (Hohwy 2013) cognitivist interpretation of predictive processing (a) does not necessarily follow from the evidence for the importance of Bayesian processing in the brain; (b) is rooted in a misunderstanding of our epistemic position in the world; and (c) is undesirable in that it leads to epistemic internalism or idealism. My claim is that the internalist/idealist conclusions do not follow from predictive processing itself, but instead from the model of perception Hohwy’s adopts, and that there are alternate models of perception that do not lend themselves to idealist conclusions. The position I advocate is similar to Andy Clark’s embodied/embedded interpretation of Bayesian processing (Clark 2015); however, I argue that Clark’s position, as currently stated, also potentially leads to idealist conclusions. I offer a specific emendation to Clark’s view that I believe avoids this pitfall.