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Authors: Eliasmith, Chris
Title: Mind games : a reply to Daniela Hill
Online publication date: 11-Nov-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In her discussion of my original article, Hill reconstructs an argument I may have been making, argues that the distinction between natural and artificial minds is not exclusive, and suggests that my reliance on behaviour as a determiner of “mindedness” is a dangerous slip back to philosophical behaviourism. In reply, I note that the logical fallacy of which I’m accused (circular reasoning) is not the one present in the reconstruction of my argument (besides the point), and offer a non-fallacious reconstruction. More importantly, I note that logical analysis does not seem appropriate for the discussion in the target article. I then agree that natural and artificial minds do not make up two discrete categories for mindedness. Finally, I note that my research program belies any behaviourist motivations, and reiterate that even though behaviour is typically important for identifying minds, I do not suggest that it is a substitute for theory. However, the target article is not about such theory, but about the near-term likelihood of sophisticated artificial minds
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551621
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
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Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 12(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570788
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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