Mind games : a reply to Daniela Hill

Abstract

In her discussion of my original article, Hill reconstructs an argument I may have been making, argues that the distinction between natural and artificial minds is not exclusive, and suggests that my reliance on behaviour as a determiner of “mindedness” is a dangerous slip back to philosophical behaviourism. In reply, I note that the logical fallacy of which I’m accused (circular reasoning) is not the one present in the reconstruction of my argument (besides the point), and offer a non-fallacious reconstruction. More importantly, I note that logical analysis does not seem appropriate for the discussion in the target article. I then agree that natural and artificial minds do not make up two discrete categories for mindedness. Finally, I note that my research program belies any behaviourist motivations, and reiterate that even though behaviour is typically important for identifying minds, I do not suggest that it is a substitute for theory. However, the target article is not about such theory, but about the near-term likelihood of sophisticated artificial minds