Introspective insecurity
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This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than others.
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Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570214