Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-431
Authors: Bayne, Tim
Title: Introspective insecurity
Online publication date: 10-Nov-2016
Language : english
Abstract: This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than others.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-431
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 3(T)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570214
Appears in Collections:Publications

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