Concept pluralism, direct perception, and the fragility of presence
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This paper has three main aims. First, I criticize intellectualism in the philosophy of mind and I outline an alternative to intellectualism that I call Concept Pluralism. Second, I seek to unify the sensorimotor or enactive approach to perception and perceptual consciousness developed in O’Regan %26 Noë (2001) and Noë (2004, 2012), with an account of understanding concepts. The proposal here —that concepts and sensorimotor skills are species of a common genus, that they are kinds of skills of access —is meant to offer an extension of the earlier account of perception. Finally, I describe a phenomenon —fragility —that has been poorly understood, but whose correct analysis is critical for progress in the theory of mind (both perception and cognition).
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Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570597