Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-669| Authors: | Noë, Alva |
| Title: | Concept pluralism, direct perception, and the fragility of presence |
| Online publication date: | 26-Oct-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | This paper has three main aims. First, I criticize intellectualism in the philosophy of mind and I outline an alternative to intellectualism that I call Concept Pluralism. Second, I seek to unify the sensorimotor or enactive approach to perception and perceptual consciousness developed in O’Regan %26 Noë (2001) and Noë (2004, 2012), with an account of understanding concepts. The proposal here —that concepts and sensorimotor skills are species of a common genus, that they are kinds of skills of access —is meant to offer an extension of the earlier account of perception. Finally, I describe a phenomenon —fragility —that has been poorly understood, but whose correct analysis is critical for progress in the theory of mind (both perception and cognition). |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-669 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550322 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 27(T) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570597 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958570597 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
