Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-669
Authors: Noë, Alva
Title: Concept pluralism, direct perception, and the fragility of presence
Online publication date: 26-Oct-2016
Language: english
Abstract: This paper has three main aims. First, I criticize intellectualism in the philosophy of mind and I outline an alternative to intellectualism that I call Concept Pluralism. Second, I seek to unify the sensorimotor or enactive approach to perception and perceptual consciousness developed in O’Regan %26 Noë (2001) and Noë (2004, 2012), with an account of understanding concepts. The proposal here —that concepts and sensorimotor skills are species of a common genus, that they are kinds of skills of access —is meant to offer an extension of the earlier account of perception. Finally, I describe a phenomenon —fragility —that has been poorly understood, but whose correct analysis is critical for progress in the theory of mind (both perception and cognition).
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-669
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550322
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 27(T)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570597
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570597
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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