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Authors: Schooler, Jonathan
Title: Stepping back and adding perspective : a reply to Verena Gottschling
Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In this reply, I circumvent (some might say dodge) a number of Gottschling’s fine-grained comments by stepping back and reviewing the key points of the three major sections of my target paper in light of her more general concerns. I first consider Gottschling’s primary criticism of the first section of my paper, namely that insights that might emerge from considering the perspective shifting associated with reversible images do not apply in the context of differences between first and third-person perspectives. Although I concede there are differences in the meaning of “perspective” in conceptual and perceptual domains, I argue that the common element of a reliance on a frame-of-reference is sufficient to make the analogy helpful. I contend that a necessary element in overcoming the limitations of particular perspectives in both conceptual and perceptual domains is attempting to consider alternative vantages. This approach is then used to justify the tack of the next two sections: considering first-person experience from the vantage of third-person science and considering third-person science from the vantage of first-person experience. I note that Gottschling is largely sympathetic to the broad goals of the second section of my paper, and observe that her major concern with the construct of experiential consciousness emerges from her burdening it with unwarranted assumptions. I use her constructive suggestion for the need for further development of the notion of meta-awareness as a springboard for introducing a previously overlooked element (experiential monitoring) that may be useful for explaining how people can knowingly monitor performance without explicit verbal re-representation. Finally, I consider Gottschlings’ view that the third section fails to add to the value of the paper. Although I acknowledge that the arguments in the second section stand independently, I argue that discussion of how science can inform experience gains greater balance by also considering how experience informs science. I close by challenging the view that knowledge gained from science necessarily trumps that gained by experience, and conclude that it remains a worthy goal to seek a meta-perspective that accommodates both first- and third-person perspectives without reducing one to the other.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553420
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
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Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 34(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570832
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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