Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-78
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Pliushch, Iuliia | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-11-30T09:35:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-11-30T10:35:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/80 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the following commentary I will first briefly review the target article, then voice some critical points, and last offer a positive proposal according to which tension in self-deception is a kind of a metacognitive feeling. Proust offers a novel, inspiring view that feelings possess an indexical (non-conceptual) format, are transparent (that is, they may be re-described in propositional terms, but not thereby changed), and acquire valence if the rate of change towards fulfilling the given affordance is greater or less than expected. In my critique I will first point to difficulties in disentangling feelings from emotions, then try to provide a more precise description of the formal object of feelings, along with some examples, and offer a definition of “directness” that is consistent with predictive coding —as well as argue that feelings might be influenced by concepts even if they themselves are non-conceptual. Last, I propose that tension in self-deception is a metacognitive feeling. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
dc.title | The extension of the indicator-function of feelings : a commentary on Joëlle Proust | en_GB |
dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553268 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-78 | - |
jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
jgu.type.resource | Text | |
jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 31(C) | |
jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570399 | |
jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
opus.date.accessioned | 2016-11-30T09:35:01Z | |
opus.date.modified | 2016-11-30T09:35:14Z | |
opus.date.available | 2016-11-30T10:35:01 | |
opus.subject.dfgcode | 00-000 | |
opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
opus.identifier.opusid | 55326 | |
opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
opus.metadataonly | false | |
opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570399 | |
jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |