Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-78
Authors: Pliushch, Iuliia
Title: The extension of the indicator-function of feelings : a commentary on Joëlle Proust
Online publication date: 30-Nov-2016
Language : english
Abstract: In the following commentary I will first briefly review the target article, then voice some critical points, and last offer a positive proposal according to which tension in self-deception is a kind of a metacognitive feeling. Proust offers a novel, inspiring view that feelings possess an indexical (non-conceptual) format, are transparent (that is, they may be re-described in propositional terms, but not thereby changed), and acquire valence if the rate of change towards fulfilling the given affordance is greater or less than expected. In my critique I will first point to difficulties in disentangling feelings from emotions, then try to provide a more precise description of the formal object of feelings, along with some examples, and offer a definition of “directness” that is consistent with predictive coding —as well as argue that feelings might be influenced by concepts even if they themselves are non-conceptual. Last, I propose that tension in self-deception is a metacognitive feeling.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-78
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 31(C)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570399
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