Should metaethical naturalists abandon de dicto internalism and cognitivism? : A reply to Yann Wilhelm
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Abstract
Yann Wilhelm pursues three issues in response to my target article. First, he tries to expose my naturalism as more radical than I let on. I concede the point, though I also offer ways in which my radicalism might be mitigated. Second, he exposes a limitation in my argument for internalism, and suggests that naturalists should defend a form of internalism that is neutral about conceptual claims (de re internalism, rather than de dicto). I welcome the suggestion, but also consider how naturalists might defend de dicto internalism. Third, Wilhelm challenges my argument against non-cognitivism, by offering a novel explanation of the fact that moral judgments have an assertoric form. In response, I note avenues for cognitivist resistance to Wilhelm’s explanation.
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Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958571075