Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-76
Authors: Prinz, Jesse
Title: Should metaethical naturalists abandon de dicto internalism and cognitivism? : A reply to Yann Wilhelm
Online publication date: 30-Nov-2016
Language : english
Abstract: Yann Wilhelm pursues three issues in response to my target article. First, he tries to expose my naturalism as more radical than I let on. I concede the point, though I also offer ways in which my radicalism might be mitigated. Second, he exposes a limitation in my argument for internalism, and suggests that naturalists should defend a form of internalism that is neutral about conceptual claims (de re internalism, rather than de dicto). I welcome the suggestion, but also consider how naturalists might defend de dicto internalism. Third, Wilhelm challenges my argument against non-cognitivism, by offering a novel explanation of the fact that moral judgments have an assertoric form. In response, I note avenues for cognitivist resistance to Wilhelm’s explanation.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-76
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 30(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571075
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