Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-75
Authors: Pacherie, Elisabeth
Title: The causal role(s) of intentions : a reply to Andrea R. Dreßing
Online publication date: 30-Nov-2016
Language : english
Abstract: In her commentary (Dreßing this collection) on my target article (Pacherie this collection), Dreßing suggests that the story I offer is not just a creation myth but also an attempt to give an explanation of the function of conscious intentions in the physical world and as such answerable to both metaphysical and empirical constraints. Here, I try to clarify which of my claims should be understood as simply speculations about the origins of our capacity of intentions and which I take to be empirical claims. In response to the metaphysical and empirical challenge Dreßing raises, I argue that Dretske’s distinction between structuring and triggering causes may help us see how explanations in terms of physical properties and explanations in terms of mental properties may not compete but rather complement each other. I argue that this distinction may also help us assuage certain worries raised by neuroscientific findings.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-75
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 29(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571129
Appears in Collections:Publications

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