Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-678
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Clark, Andy | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-11-02T08:41:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-11-02T09:41:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/680 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Versions of the “predictive brain” hypothesis rank among the most promising and the most conceptually challenging visions ever to emerge from computational and cognitive neuroscience. In this paper, I briefly introduce (section 1) the most radical and comprehensive of these visions —the account of “active inference”, or “action-oriented predictive processing” (Clark 2013a), developed by Karl Friston and colleagues. In section 2, I isolate and discuss four of the framework’s most provocative claims: (i) that the core flow of information is top-down, not bottom-up, with the forward flow of sensory information replaced by the forward flow of prediction error; (ii) that motor control is just more top-down sensory prediction; (iii) that efference copies, and distinct “controllers”, can be replaced by top-down predictions; and (iv) that cost functions can fruitfully be replaced by predictions. Working together, these four claims offer a tantalizing glimpse of a new, integrated framework for understanding perception, action, embodiment, and the nature of human experience. I end (section 3) by sketching what may be the most important aspect of the emerging view: its ability to embed the use of fast and frugal solutions (as highlighted by much work in robotics and embodied cognition) within an over-arching scheme that includes more structured, knowledge-intensive strategies, combining these fluently and continuously as task and context dictate. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
dc.title | Embodied prediction | en_GB |
dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550584 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-678 | - |
jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
jgu.type.resource | Text | |
jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 7(T) | |
jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570115 | |
jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
opus.date.accessioned | 2016-11-02T08:41:05Z | |
opus.date.modified | 2016-11-02T08:46:45Z | |
opus.date.available | 2016-11-02T09:41:05 | |
opus.subject.dfgcode | 00-000 | |
opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
opus.identifier.opusid | 55058 | |
opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
opus.metadataonly | false | |
opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570115 | |
jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |