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Authors: Koch, Anne-Kathrin
Title: Does resemblance really matter? : A commentary on Gerard O'Brien
Online publication date: 31-Oct-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In this commentary on Gerard O’Brien’s “How does mind matter? —Solving the content causation problem”, I will investigate the notion of representational content presented in the latter. With this notion, O’Brien aims at giving an explanation of how mind matters in physicalist terms. His argumentation is motivated by, and supposedly directed towards, a problem he calls the content causation problem. Regarding this, I am most interested in reconstructing how his account relates to the presuppositions that make this problem so pressing in philosophical enquiry. O’Brien provides a very interesting answer to the question of “why mental content matters”, as motivated by the content causation problem. In particular, I will try to show that by making use of the notion of dispositions, it provides an interesting way of avoiding the presupposition that understanding content causation always requires the reduction of individual relational properties to individual intrinsic properties —probably because it is presupposed that such a reduction is impossible.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550550
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
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Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 28(C)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958571051
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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