Can experiential ownership violate the immunity principle? : A reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
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In what follows, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms of my target paper and defend the following claims: (1) the sense of experiential ownership can misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership; (2) the sense of experiential ownership is eligible to serve as a bearer of IEM; (3) at least some versions of IEM face genuine counterexamples; and (4) as far as the sense of self-as-subject is concerned, IEM is not a trivial property. Finally, I describe a new set of experiments that induced what I call “the self-touching illusion.” The data, I suggest, strengthen the view that both the sense of self-as-subject and IEM are open to empirical as well as philosophical investigation.
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Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570948