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Authors: Liang, Caleb
Title: Can experiential ownership violate the immunity principle? : A reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
Online publication date: 26-Oct-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In what follows, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms of my target paper and defend the following claims: (1) the sense of experiential ownership can misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership; (2) the sense of experiential ownership is eligible to serve as a bearer of IEM; (3) at least some versions of IEM face genuine counterexamples; and (4) as far as the sense of self-as-subject is concerned, IEM is not a trivial property. Finally, I describe a new set of experiments that induced what I call “the self-touching illusion.” The data, I suggest, strengthen the view that both the sense of self-as-subject and IEM are open to empirical as well as philosophical investigation.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550266
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
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Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 24(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570948
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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