Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-664| Authors: | Liang, Caleb |
| Title: | Can experiential ownership violate the immunity principle? : A reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung |
| Online publication date: | 26-Oct-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | In what follows, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms of my target paper and defend the following claims: (1) the sense of experiential ownership can misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership; (2) the sense of experiential ownership is eligible to serve as a bearer of IEM; (3) at least some versions of IEM face genuine counterexamples; and (4) as far as the sense of self-as-subject is concerned, IEM is not a trivial property. Finally, I describe a new set of experiments that induced what I call “the self-touching illusion.” The data, I suggest, strengthen the view that both the sense of self-as-subject and IEM are open to empirical as well as philosophical investigation. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-664 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550266 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 24(R) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570948 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958570948 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
