Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-659
Authors: | Noë, Alva |
Title: | Beyond agency : a reply to Miriam Kyselo |
Online publication date: | 24-Oct-2016 |
Year of first publication: | 2015 |
Language: | english |
Abstract: | In this paper I respond to Kyselo’s (this collection) claim that actionism, and other versions of the enactive embodied approach to mind, fail to accord social relations a constitutive role in making up the human mind. I argue that actionism can meet this challenge—the view makes relations to others central to an account of human experience—but I also question whether the challenge is clear enough. I ask: what exactly does it mean to say that social relations play this sort of constitutive role? |
DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
Place: | Mainz |
ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-659 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550061 |
Version: | Published version |
Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
License: | In Copyright |
Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
Pages or article number: | Kap. 27(R) |
Publisher: | MIND Group |
Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
Issue date: | 2015 |
Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571068 |
Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958571068 |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |