Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-659
Authors: Noë, Alva
Title: Beyond agency : a reply to Miriam Kyselo
Online publication date: 24-Oct-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In this paper I respond to Kyselo’s (this collection) claim that actionism, and other versions of the enactive embodied approach to mind, fail to accord social relations a constitutive role in making up the human mind. I argue that actionism can meet this challenge—the view makes relations to others central to an account of human experience—but I also question whether the challenge is clear enough. I ask: what exactly does it mean to say that social relations play this sort of constitutive role?
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-659
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550061
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 27(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571068
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958571068
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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