Bitte benutzen Sie diese Kennung, um auf die Ressource zu verweisen: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-642
Autoren: Metzinger, Thomas
Titel: The problem of mental action : predictive control without sensory sheets
Online-Publikationsdatum: 1-Jun-2017
Sprache des Dokuments: Englisch
Zusammenfassung/Abstract: In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first positive model, focussing on epistemic mental actions and epistemic self-control. Action initiation is a functionally adequate form of self-deception; mental actions are a specific form of predictive control of effective connectivity, accompanied and possibly even functionally mediated by a conscious “epistemic agent model”. The overall process is aimed at increasing the epistemic value of pre-existing states in the conscious self-model, without causally looping through sensory sheets or using the non-neural body as an instrument for active inference.
DDC-Sachgruppe: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Veröffentlichende Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Organisationseinheit: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Veröffentlichungsort: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-642
Version: Published version
Publikationstyp: Buchbeitrag
Nutzungsrechte: in Copyright
Informationen zu den Nutzungsrechten: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Quelle: Philosophy and predictive processing
Metzinger, Thomas
Seitenzahl oder Artikelnummer: 296
321
Verlag: MIND Group
Verlagsort: Frankfurt am Main
Erscheinungsdatum: 2017
URL der Originalveröffentlichung: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573208
Enthalten in den Sammlungen:Publications

Dateien zu dieser Ressource:
Datei GrößeFormat 
56661.pdf485.17 kBAdobe PDFÖffnen/Anzeigen