Authors:	Metzinger, Thomas
Title:	The problem of mental action : predictive control without sensory sheets
Online publication date:	1-Jun-2017
Year of first publication:	2017
Language:	english
Abstract:	In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first positive model, focussing on epistemic mental actions and epistemic self-control. Action initiation is a functionally adequate form of self-deception; mental actions are a specific form of predictive control of effective connectivity, accompanied and possibly even functionally mediated by a conscious “epistemic agent model”. The overall process is aimed at increasing the epistemic value of pre-existing states in the conscious self-model, without causally looping through sensory sheets or using the non-neural body as an instrument for active inference.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-642
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566618
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	CC BY-ND
Information on rights of use:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Citation:	Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	296 321
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2017
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573208
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958573208
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen