Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-630
Authors: | Burr, Christopher |
Title: | Embodied decisions and the predictive brain |
Online publication date: | 1-Jun-2017 |
Year of first publication: | 2017 |
Language: | english |
Abstract: | A cognitivist account of decision-making views choice behaviour as a serial process of deliberation and commitment, which is separate from perception and action. By contrast, recent work in embodied decision-making has argued that this account is incompatible with emerging neurophysiological data. We argue that this account has significant overlap with an embodied account of predictive processing, and that both can offer mutual development for the other. However, more importantly, by demonstrating this close connection we uncover an alternative perspective on the nature of decision-making, and the mechanisms that underlie our choice behaviour. This alternative perspective allows us to respond to a challenge for predictive processing, which claims that the satisfaction of distal goal-states is underspecified. Answering this challenge requires the adoption of an embodied perspective. |
DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
Place: | Mainz |
ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-630 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566492 |
Version: | Published version |
Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
License: | CC BY-ND |
Information on rights of use: | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ |
Citation: | Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas |
Pages or article number: | 109 131 |
Publisher: | MIND Group |
Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
Issue date: | 2017 |
Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573086 |
Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958573086 |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |