Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Bruineberg, Jelle | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-01T10:26:42Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-06-01T12:26:42Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/630 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. forthcoming) and will then show how agency and intentionality are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways. | en_GB |
| dc.language.iso | eng | - |
| dc.rights | CC BY-ND | de_DE |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ | - |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
| dc.title | Active inference and the primacy of the ‘I can’ | en_GB |
| dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
| dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566478 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628 | - |
| jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | - |
| jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
| jgu.type.resource | Text | - |
| jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
| jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
| jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
| jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
| jgu.book.title | Philosophy and predictive processing | - |
| jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | - |
| jgu.pages.start | 74 | - |
| jgu.pages.end | 91 | - |
| jgu.publisher.year | 2017 | - |
| jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | - |
| jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | - |
| jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573062 | - |
| jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
| jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | - |
| opus.date.accessioned | 2017-06-01T10:26:42Z | - |
| opus.date.modified | 2017-06-02T07:20:16Z | - |
| opus.date.available | 2017-06-01T12:26:42 | - |
| opus.subject.dfgcode | 00-000 | - |
| opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
| opus.identifier.opusid | 56647 | - |
| opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Philosophy and predictive processing | de_DE |
| opus.institute.number | 0508 | - |
| opus.metadataonly | false | - |
| opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
| opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
| jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958573062 | |
| jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen | |
