Bitte benutzen Sie diese Kennung, um auf die Ressource zu verweisen: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628
Autoren: Bruineberg, Jelle
Titel: Active inference and the primacy of the ‘I can’
Online-Publikationsdatum: 1-Jun-2017
Erscheinungsdatum: 2017
Sprache des Dokuments: Englisch
Zusammenfassung/Abstract: This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. forthcoming) and will then show how agency and intentionality are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways.
DDC-Sachgruppe: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Veröffentlichende Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Organisationseinheit: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Veröffentlichungsort: Mainz
ROR: https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566478
Version: Published version
Publikationstyp: Buchbeitrag
Nutzungsrechte: CC BY-ND
Informationen zu den Nutzungsrechten: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Quelle: Philosophy and predictive processing
Metzinger, Thomas
Seitenzahl oder Artikelnummer: 74
91
Verlag: MIND Group
Verlagsort: Frankfurt am Main
Erscheinungsdatum: 2017
URL der Originalveröffentlichung: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573062
DOI der Originalveröffentlichung: 10.15502/9783958573062
Enthalten in den Sammlungen:JGU-Publikationen

Dateien zu dieser Ressource:
  Datei Beschreibung GrößeFormat
Miniaturbild
56647.pdf332.29 kBAdobe PDFÖffnen/Anzeigen