Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628| Authors: | Bruineberg, Jelle |
| Title: | Active inference and the primacy of the ‘I can’ |
| Online publication date: | 1-Jun-2017 |
| Year of first publication: | 2017 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. forthcoming) and will then show how agency and intentionality are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-628 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566478 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | CC BY-ND |
| Information on rights of use: | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/ |
| Citation: | Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | 74 91 |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2017 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573062 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958573062 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
