Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Authors: Quadt, Lisa
Title: Multiplicity needs coherence : towards a unifying framework for social understanding ; a commentary on Albert Newen
Online publication date: 14-Nov-2016
Language: english
Abstract: In this commentary, I focus on Albert Newen’s multiplicity view (MV) and aim to provide an alternative framework in which it can be embedded. Newen claims that social understanding draws on at least four different epistemic mechanisms, thus rejecting the idea that there is a default mechanism for social cognition. I claim that MV runs the risk of combining elements that have been described in metaphysically incompatible theories. I will argue that multiplicity needs coherence, which can be achieved by applying the theoretical framework of first-, second-, and third-order embodiment (1-3E; Metzinger 2014) to the study of social cognition. The modified version of this theory, 1-3sE (first-, second-, and third-order social embodiment), can serve as a unifying framework for a pluralistic account of social understanding.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551691
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use:
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 26(C)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958571112
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

Files in This Item:
  File Description SizeFormat
55169.pdf266.49 kBAdobe PDFView/Open