Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-431| Authors: | Bayne, Tim |
| Title: | Introspective insecurity |
| Online publication date: | 10-Nov-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than others. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-431 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551351 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 3(T) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570214 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958570214 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
