Introspection and intuition : a reply to Maximilian H. Engel
Files
Date issued
Authors
Editors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
License
Abstract
This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel’s commentary on my target paper, in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Published in
Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570764