Authors:	Engel, Maximilian H.
Title:	“I just knew that!” : Intuitions as scaffolded or freestanding judgements ; a commentary on Tim Bayne
Online publication date:	8-Nov-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	How reliable are intuitive or introspective judgments? This question has produced lively debates in two respective discussions. In this commentary I will try to show that the two phenomena of introspective and intuitive judgments are very closely related, so that the two separate philosophical debates about them can substantially inform each other. In particular, the intuition debate can profit from conceptual tools that have already been introduced to discussions about the reliability of introspection. Especially the distinction between scaffolded and freestanding judgements, which has been developed by Tim Bayne %26 Maja Spener (2010), can be used to more carefully investigate intuitions with respect to their epistemic reliability. After briefly applying this framework to some paradigm cases of “philosophically interesting” intuitions, I will come to the conclusion that most of these must be regarded as freestanding judgments and thus cannot play the role of reliable sources of evidence that they are supposed to play in some discussions in contemporary epistemology and methodology.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-425
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551142
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 3(C)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570382
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958570382
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen