Bitte benutzen Sie diese Kennung, um auf die Ressource zu verweisen: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-417
Autoren: Proust, Joëlle
Titel: Feelings as evaluative indicators : a reply to Iuliia Pliushch
Online-Publikationsdatum: 4-Nov-2016
Erscheinungsdatum: 2015
Sprache des Dokuments: Englisch
Zusammenfassung/Abstract: These responses aim at clarifying various aspects and implications of my proposal that feelings are affordance sensings. Affective quality, in the present proposal, extends beyond the domain of primary and secondary emotions to all feelings, because it results from specific features in the dynamics of valence. Feelings do not convey an explicit causal information about the world. Causal relations are, rather, implicitly represented in a felt affordance through the dynamic relations between the associated, embodied cues for location, valence and intensity and type of the affordance. Affordances are neither perceived nor inferred; they are ßensed", which is an ability distinct from belief, whose informational input is derived from features of a perceived or interpreted situation or cognitive task. The input for an affordance sensing can well be conceptual; it is claimed, however, that even when a task is represented through concepts, the affordance-sensings elicited during the task are nonconceptual and evaluative. The relevant properties in affordance-sensings being dynamic, an interpretation of the view under discussion as being serial is resisted. Finally, Pliushch's proposal for extending this theory to an interpretation of the feelings involved in self-deception is discussed.
DDC-Sachgruppe: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Veröffentlichende Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Organisationseinheit: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Veröffentlichungsort: Mainz
ROR: https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-417
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551041
Version: Published version
Publikationstyp: Buchbeitrag
Nutzungsrechte: Urheberrechtsschutz
Informationen zu den Nutzungsrechten: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Quelle: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Seitenzahl oder Artikelnummer: Kap. 31(R)
Verlag: MIND Group
Verlagsort: Frankfurt am Main
Erscheinungsdatum: 2015
URL der Originalveröffentlichung: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570955
DOI der Originalveröffentlichung: 10.15502/9783958570955
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