Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-417
Authors: Proust, Joëlle
Title: Feelings as evaluative indicators : a reply to Iuliia Pliushch
Online publication date: 4-Nov-2016
Year of first publication: 2015
Language: english
Abstract: These responses aim at clarifying various aspects and implications of my proposal that feelings are affordance sensings. Affective quality, in the present proposal, extends beyond the domain of primary and secondary emotions to all feelings, because it results from specific features in the dynamics of valence. Feelings do not convey an explicit causal information about the world. Causal relations are, rather, implicitly represented in a felt affordance through the dynamic relations between the associated, embodied cues for location, valence and intensity and type of the affordance. Affordances are neither perceived nor inferred; they are ßensed", which is an ability distinct from belief, whose informational input is derived from features of a perceived or interpreted situation or cognitive task. The input for an affordance sensing can well be conceptual; it is claimed, however, that even when a task is represented through concepts, the affordance-sensings elicited during the task are nonconceptual and evaluative. The relevant properties in affordance-sensings being dynamic, an interpretation of the view under discussion as being serial is resisted. Finally, Pliushch's proposal for extending this theory to an interpretation of the feelings involved in self-deception is discussed.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
ROR: https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-417
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551041
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: In Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 31(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570955
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570955
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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