A multiplicity view for social cognition : defending a coherent framework ; a reply to Lisa Quadt
Loading...
Files
Date issued
Authors
Editors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Reuse License
Abstract
Lisa Quadt’s commentary focuses on my theory about the multiple epistemic strategies humans use to receive information about one other’s mental phenomena. She develops a principle worry about the theory’s underlying metaphysical foundations, arguing that I am committed to an incoherent metaphysical framework. In this reply, I show that I am not committed to the position she attributes to me and I outline an alternative framework that is my actual background view. I illustrate this framework by discussing emotions and argue that emotions are individuated as integrated patterns of characteristic features. This enables me to combine a representational account of emotions with a theory of direct perception of basic emotions as well as with an understanding of some emotions relying on theory-based inferences. Thus, I have a coherent metaphysics. Finally, I show that the alternative suggested by Quadt has its own problems.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Published in
Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958571167