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Authors: Newen, Albert
Title: A multiplicity view for social cognition : defending a coherent framework ; a reply to Lisa Quadt
Online publication date: 21-Oct-2016
Language: english
Abstract: Lisa Quadt’s commentary focuses on my theory about the multiple epistemic strategies humans use to receive information about one other’s mental phenomena. She develops a principle worry about the theory’s underlying metaphysical foundations, arguing that I am committed to an incoherent metaphysical framework. In this reply, I show that I am not committed to the position she attributes to me and I outline an alternative framework that is my actual background view. I illustrate this framework by discussing emotions and argue that emotions are individuated as integrated patterns of characteristic features. This enables me to combine a representational account of emotions with a theory of direct perception of basic emotions as well as with an understanding of some emotions relying on theory-based inferences. Thus, I have a coherent metaphysics. Finally, I show that the alternative suggested by Quadt has its own problems.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-549893
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: In Copyright
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Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 26(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958571167
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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