Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-139| Authors: | Dennett, Daniel C. |
| Title: | Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems? |
| Online publication date: | 28-Nov-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | A re-expression of some of the troublesome features of my oft-caricatured theory of consciousness, with new emphases, brings out the strengths of the view and shows how it comports with and anticipates the recent introduction of Bayesian approaches to cognitive science. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-139 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-552883 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 10(T) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570245 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958570245 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
