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Authors: Block, Ned
Title: Solely generic phenomenology : a reply to Sascha Benjamin Fink
Online publication date: 28-Nov-2016
Language: english
Abstract: If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink argues that there is a danger of trivialization of phenomenal precision and that the one way out may be incompatible with my view that consciousness overflows cognition. I try to say more about how to clarify phenomenal precision and its relation to my views on overflow.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-552845
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use:
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 5(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958571150
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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