Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-134
Authors: Block, Ned
Title: The puzzle of perceptual precision
Online publication date: 28-Nov-2016
Language : english
Abstract: This paper argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representation and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation, we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally precise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evidence to the contrary. The conclusion is that perceptual representation cannot ground what it is like to perceive.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-134
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 5(T)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher Place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher's URL : http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570726
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