The semantic reading of propositionality and its relation to cognitive-representational explanations : a commentary on Andreas Bartels & Mark May
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Bartels and May propose an explanation of the difference between practical and theoretical knowledge in terms of the involvement of non-conceptual and conceptual representations, respectively. They thereby want to alleviate a shortcoming of Stanley’s intellectualist theory of knowledge-how that cannot explain this difference. In this paper it is argued that an appreciation of the fact that both Stanley and Bartels and May employ a semantic reading of propositionality makes clear that their endeavors follow quite different goals. While Stanley gives an analysis of how we talk about knowledge-how, Bartels and May are interested in underlying cognitive representations. From Stanley’s analysis of knowledge-how, nothing can be inferred about cognitive representations. The semantic reading of propositionality is then spelled out with the help of the idea that ascriptions of propositional attitudes are (like) measurement statements. Some considerations from measurement theory show how propositions can be used to reason about psychological states without themselves having to play any role in a person’s psychology.
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Open MIND, Metzinger, Thomas, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main, 2015, https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570177