Are there counterexamples to the immunity principle? : Some restrictions and clarifications ; a commentary on Caleb Liang

Abstract

Our commentary focuses on the sense of experiential ownership and its implications for the Immunity Principle. In general we think that Liang elaborates the self-as-object and the self-as-subject in an interesting and refreshing way. Nevertheless, there are some problems that we want to address. (1) First, we argue that the sense of experiential ownership cannot misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership. (2) Second, we argue that neither the sense of experiential ownership in particular nor phenomenal states in general are eligible for identity judgments. (3) Then we claim that the two alleged counterexamples actually do not provide any valid argument against IEM. (4) We close by evaluating whether it makes sense to talk about the Immunity Principle as a non-trivial property, or whether the relevant properties are just mispredication or misguided reference.