Future games : a commentary on Chris Eliasmith

Abstract

In this commentary, the future of artificial minds as it is presented by the target article will be reconstructed. I shall suggest two readings of Eliasmith’s claims: one regards them as a thought experiment, the other as a formal argument. While the latter reading is at odds with Eliasmith’s own remarks throughout the paper, it is nonetheless useful because it helps to reveal the implicit background assumptions underlying his reasoning. For this reason, I begin by “virtually reconstructing” his claims as an argument —that is, by formalizing his implicit premises and conclusion. This leads to my second claim, namely that more than technological equipment and biologically inspired hardware will be needed to build artificial minds. I then raise the question of whether we will produce minds at all, or rather functionally differentiated, fragmented derivates which might turn out not to be notably relevant for philosophy (e.g., from an ethical perspective). As a potential alternative to artificial minds, I present the notion of postbiotic systems. These two scenarios call for adjustments of ethical theories, as well as some caution in the development of already-existing artificial systems.