Functional attributions and functional architecture : a reply to Axel Kohler

Abstract

In his commentary (Kohler this collection) on my target article (Anderson this collection), Axel Kohler suggests that componential mechanism (Craver 2008) in fact suffices as a framework for understanding function-structure relationships, even in complex cases such as direction selectivity in Starburst Amacrine Cells. Here I’ll argue that while Kohler is correct that the framework can accommodate such cases, this approach misses an opportunity to draw important distinctions between what appear to be different sorts of relationships between functioning systems and the mechanisms in virtue of which they function. I tentatively suggest further that the avenue that one prefers may turn on whether one expects the functional architecture of the brain to be primarily componential and hierarchical (Craver 2008; this collection) or typically more complex than that (Pessoa 2014).