Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-76| Authors: | Prinz, Jesse |
| Title: | Should metaethical naturalists abandon de dicto internalism and cognitivism? : A reply to Yann Wilhelm |
| Online publication date: | 30-Nov-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | Yann Wilhelm pursues three issues in response to my target article. First, he tries to expose my naturalism as more radical than I let on. I concede the point, though I also offer ways in which my radicalism might be mitigated. Second, he exposes a limitation in my argument for internalism, and suggests that naturalists should defend a form of internalism that is neutral about conceptual claims (de re internalism, rather than de dicto). I welcome the suggestion, but also consider how naturalists might defend de dicto internalism. Third, Wilhelm challenges my argument against non-cognitivism, by offering a novel explanation of the fact that moral judgments have an assertoric form. In response, I note avenues for cognitivist resistance to Wilhelm’s explanation. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-76 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553242 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 30(R) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571075 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958571075 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
