Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-70Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Liang, Caleb | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-11-29T10:30:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-11-29T11:30:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/72 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In what follows, I investigate the distinction between the sense of self-as-object and the sense of self-as-subject, and propose an account that is different from Shoemaker’s immunity principle. I suggest that this distinction can be elucidated by examining two types of self-experience: the sense of body ownership and the sense of experiential ownership. The former concerns self-as-object: whether a body part or a full body belongs to me. The latter concerns self-as-subject: whether I represent myself as the unique subject of experience. A key point is that misrepresentation can occur not only in the sense of body ownership but also in the sense of experiential ownership. Then I examine the most relevant neuroscientific accounts of the sense of self-as-subject, including Damasio’s account of the core-self, Panksepp’s affective neuroscience, neural synchrony, and the subcortical-cortical midline structures. I argue that none of these successfully explains the neural basis of the sense of self-as-subject. In order to make progress, I suggest, the first step is to look for and then to study the various conditions in which one can pursue the “Wittgenstein Question”. | en_GB |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
| dc.title | Self-as-subject and experiential ownership | en_GB |
| dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
| dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553082 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-70 | - |
| jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
| jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
| jgu.type.resource | Text | |
| jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
| jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
| jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
| jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
| jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
| jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
| jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 24(T) | |
| jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
| jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
| jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
| jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570030 | |
| jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
| jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
| opus.date.accessioned | 2016-11-29T10:30:43Z | |
| opus.date.modified | 2016-11-29T10:31:45Z | |
| opus.date.available | 2016-11-29T11:30:43 | |
| opus.subject.dfgcode | 00-000 | |
| opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
| opus.identifier.opusid | 55308 | |
| opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
| opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
| opus.metadataonly | false | |
| opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
| opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
| jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570030 | |
| jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen | |
