Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-70
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dc.contributor.authorLiang, Caleb
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-29T10:30:43Z
dc.date.available2016-11-29T11:30:43
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/72-
dc.description.abstractIn what follows, I investigate the distinction between the sense of self-as-object and the sense of self-as-subject, and propose an account that is different from Shoemaker’s immunity principle. I suggest that this distinction can be elucidated by examining two types of self-experience: the sense of body ownership and the sense of experiential ownership. The former concerns self-as-object: whether a body part or a full body belongs to me. The latter concerns self-as-subject: whether I represent myself as the unique subject of experience. A key point is that misrepresentation can occur not only in the sense of body ownership but also in the sense of experiential ownership. Then I examine the most relevant neuroscientific accounts of the sense of self-as-subject, including Damasio’s account of the core-self, Panksepp’s affective neuroscience, neural synchrony, and the subcortical-cortical midline structures. I argue that none of these successfully explains the neural basis of the sense of self-as-subject. In order to make progress, I suggest, the first step is to look for and then to study the various conditions in which one can pursue the “Wittgenstein Question”.en_GB
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsin Copyrightde_DE
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleSelf-as-subject and experiential ownershipen_GB
dc.typeBuchbeitragde_DE
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553082
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-70-
jgu.type.dinitypebookPart
jgu.type.versionPublished versionen_GB
jgu.type.resourceText
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologie-
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.book.titleOpen MIND
jgu.book.editorMetzinger, Thomas
jgu.pages.alternativeKap. 24(T)
jgu.publisher.year2015
jgu.publisher.nameMIND Group
jgu.publisher.placeFrankfurt am Main
jgu.publisher.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570030
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100
opus.date.accessioned2016-11-29T10:30:43Z
opus.date.modified2016-11-29T10:31:45Z
opus.date.available2016-11-29T11:30:43
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid55308
opus.relation.ispartofcollectionOpen Mindde_DE
opus.institute.number0508
opus.metadataonlyfalse
opus.type.contenttypeKeinede_DE
opus.type.contenttypeNoneen_GB
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