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http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-670Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Wilhelm, Yann | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-10-26T08:58:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-10-26T10:58:33Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/672 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In this commentary on Prinz’s “Naturalizing Metaethics” I shall first look briefly at his methodological assumptions. I will argue that Prinz’s approach is more radical and less conciliatory between analytical and empirical approaches than it seems from his own description. In the second part of my commentary, I shall look at one possible objection to Prinz’s sentimentalism: the evidence he presents does not provide the needed modal strength for sentimentalism. I shall present two example of this objection, and argue that Prinz’s own depiction doesn’t adequately represent it. I shall then use the helpful distinction offered by Jon Tresan between de dicto- and de re-internalism to analyze underlying problems in the objection. I will present another way of reacting to it, which I think fits nicely with Prinz’s naturalized methodology. In the last part, I shall look at his critique of non-cognitivism. Prinz argues that non-cognitivism makes certain linguistic predictions that turn out to be wrong: if non-cognitivism were true we would expect our moral language to reflect this. I will argue that there are many forms of non-cognitivism that predict this surface grammar. The key idea is that non-cognitivism entails a pragmatic theory of moral language. I then offer a speculative explanation about why the moral language has its surface form. This speculation, I argue, has at least the same amount of plausibility as cognitivist theories. Furthermore, this possible explanation is open to empirical investigation. I agree with Prinz that, ultimately, metaethical theories should be tested against empirical evidence. Prinz presents conceptual and empirical work as mutually enhancing enterprises. My commentary is, I hope, a small contribution highlighting the conceptual side of the coin. | en_GB |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
| dc.title | Conceptualizing metaethics : a commentary on Prinz | en_GB |
| dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
| dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550332 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-670 | - |
| jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
| jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
| jgu.type.resource | Text | |
| jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
| jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
| jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
| jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
| jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
| jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
| jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 30(C) | |
| jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
| jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
| jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
| jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570689 | |
| jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
| jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
| opus.date.accessioned | 2016-10-26T08:58:33Z | |
| opus.date.modified | 2016-10-31T11:34:45Z | |
| opus.date.available | 2016-10-26T10:58:33 | |
| opus.subject.dfgcode | 01-108 | |
| opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
| opus.identifier.opusid | 55033 | |
| opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
| opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
| opus.metadataonly | false | |
| opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
| opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
| jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570689 | |
| jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen | |
