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http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-670
Autoren: | Wilhelm, Yann |
Titel: | Conceptualizing metaethics : a commentary on Prinz |
Online-Publikationsdatum: | 26-Okt-2016 |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2015 |
Sprache des Dokuments: | Englisch |
Zusammenfassung/Abstract: | In this commentary on Prinz’s “Naturalizing Metaethics” I shall first look briefly at his methodological assumptions. I will argue that Prinz’s approach is more radical and less conciliatory between analytical and empirical approaches than it seems from his own description. In the second part of my commentary, I shall look at one possible objection to Prinz’s sentimentalism: the evidence he presents does not provide the needed modal strength for sentimentalism. I shall present two example of this objection, and argue that Prinz’s own depiction doesn’t adequately represent it. I shall then use the helpful distinction offered by Jon Tresan between de dicto- and de re-internalism to analyze underlying problems in the objection. I will present another way of reacting to it, which I think fits nicely with Prinz’s naturalized methodology. In the last part, I shall look at his critique of non-cognitivism. Prinz argues that non-cognitivism makes certain linguistic predictions that turn out to be wrong: if non-cognitivism were true we would expect our moral language to reflect this. I will argue that there are many forms of non-cognitivism that predict this surface grammar. The key idea is that non-cognitivism entails a pragmatic theory of moral language. I then offer a speculative explanation about why the moral language has its surface form. This speculation, I argue, has at least the same amount of plausibility as cognitivist theories. Furthermore, this possible explanation is open to empirical investigation. I agree with Prinz that, ultimately, metaethical theories should be tested against empirical evidence. Prinz presents conceptual and empirical work as mutually enhancing enterprises. My commentary is, I hope, a small contribution highlighting the conceptual side of the coin. |
DDC-Sachgruppe: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
Veröffentlichende Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
Organisationseinheit: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
Veröffentlichungsort: | Mainz |
ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-670 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550332 |
Version: | Published version |
Publikationstyp: | Buchbeitrag |
Nutzungsrechte: | Urheberrechtsschutz |
Informationen zu den Nutzungsrechten: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
Quelle: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
Seitenzahl oder Artikelnummer: | Kap. 30(C) |
Verlag: | MIND Group |
Verlagsort: | Frankfurt am Main |
Erscheinungsdatum: | 2015 |
URL der Originalveröffentlichung: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570689 |
DOI der Originalveröffentlichung: | 10.15502/9783958570689 |
Enthalten in den Sammlungen: | JGU-Publikationen |
Dateien zu dieser Ressource:
Datei | Beschreibung | Größe | Format | ||
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55033.pdf | 153.04 kB | Adobe PDF | Öffnen/Anzeigen |