Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-642
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dc.contributor.authorMetzinger, Thomas-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-01T10:39:39Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-01T12:39:39Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/644-
dc.description.abstractIn mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first positive model, focussing on epistemic mental actions and epistemic self-control. Action initiation is a functionally adequate form of self-deception; mental actions are a specific form of predictive control of effective connectivity, accompanied and possibly even functionally mediated by a conscious “epistemic agent model”. The overall process is aimed at increasing the epistemic value of pre-existing states in the conscious self-model, without causally looping through sensory sheets or using the non-neural body as an instrument for active inference.en_GB
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.rightsCC BY-NDde_DE
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/-
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleThe problem of mental action : predictive control without sensory sheetsen_GB
dc.typeBuchbeitragde_DE
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566618-
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-642-
jgu.type.dinitypebookPart-
jgu.type.versionPublished versionen_GB
jgu.type.resourceText-
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologie-
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.book.titlePhilosophy and predictive processing-
jgu.book.editorMetzinger, Thomas-
jgu.pages.start296-
jgu.pages.end321-
jgu.publisher.year2017-
jgu.publisher.nameMIND Group-
jgu.publisher.placeFrankfurt am Main-
jgu.publisher.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573208-
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100-
opus.date.accessioned2017-06-01T10:39:39Z-
opus.date.modified2017-08-10T12:16:28Z-
opus.date.available2017-06-01T12:39:39-
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000-
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid56661-
opus.relation.ispartofcollectionPhilosophy and predictive processingde_DE
opus.institute.number0508-
opus.metadataonlyfalse-
opus.type.contenttypeKeinede_DE
opus.type.contenttypeNoneen_GB
opus.affiliatedMetzinger, Thomas-
jgu.publisher.doi10.15502/9783958573208
jgu.organisation.rorhttps://ror.org/023b0x485
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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