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Authors: Downey, Adrian
Title: Radical sensorimotor enactivism & predictive processing : providing a conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception
Online publication date: 1-Jun-2017
Year of first publication: 2017
Language: english
Abstract: In this paper I outline and defend a novel approach to conscious perception, which I label “radical sensorimotor enactivism”. The aims of the paper are two-fold: (1) to respond to a common objection to theories like radical sensorimotor enactivism— that they are empirically vacuous— and explain why, because radical sensorimotor enactivism uses (a non-representational version of) predictive processing to operationalize its sub-personal aspects, this objection cannot be levelled at the theory; and, (2) to argue that radical sensorimotor enactivism provides a better empirical account of conscious perception than predictive processing taken as a stand-alone theory. I conclude that radical sensorimotor enactivism provides one with a strong over-arching conceptual framework for the scientific study of conscious perception which clarifies the relation between existing strands of empirical work and provides practical guidance for future research. As such, it is worthy of further development, study, and application in empirical settings.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566537
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: CC BY-ND
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Citation: Philosophy and predictive processing
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: 180
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2017
Publisher URL:
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958573123
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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