Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-5119
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dc.contributor.authorWiese, Wanja-
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-07T10:15:14Z-
dc.date.available2020-09-07T10:15:14Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/5123-
dc.description.abstractThis article discusses a hypothesis recently put forward by Kanai et al., according to which information generation constitutes a functional basis of, and a sufficient condition for, consciousness. Information generation involves the ability to compress and subsequently decompress information, potentially after a temporal delay and adapted to current purposes. I will argue that information generation should not be regarded as a sufficient condition for consciousness, but could serve as what I will call a “minimal unifying model of consciousness.” A minimal unifying model (MUM) specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows that it is entailed by (many) existing theories of consciousness. Information generation fulfills these requirements. A MUM of consciousness is useful, because it unifies existing theories of consciousness by highlighting their common assumptions, while enabling further developments from which empirical predictions can be derived. Unlike existing theories (which probably contain at least some false assumptions), a MUM is thus likely to be an adequate model of consciousness, albeit at a relatively general level. Assumptions embodied in such a model are less informative than assumptions made by more specific theories and hence function more in the way of guiding principles. Still, they enable further refinements, in line with new empirical results and broader theoretical and evolutionary considerations. This also allows developing the model in ways that facilitate more specific claims and predictions.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipDFG, Open Access-Publizieren Universität Mainz / Universitätsmedizin Mainzde
dc.language.isoengde
dc.rightsCC-BY-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleThe science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying modelen_GB
dc.typeZeitschriftenaufsatzde
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-5119-
jgu.type.dinitypearticleen_GB
jgu.type.versionPublished versionde
jgu.type.resourceTextde
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologiede
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.journal.titleNeuroscience of consciousnessde
jgu.journal.volume6de
jgu.journal.issue1de
jgu.pages.alternativeniaa013de
jgu.publisher.year2020-
jgu.publisher.nameOxford Univ. Pressde
jgu.publisher.placeOxfordde
jgu.publisher.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa013de
jgu.publisher.issn2057-2107de
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100de
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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