Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-8133
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dc.contributor.authorWindt, Jennifer M.-
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-21T07:06:24Z-
dc.date.available2022-10-21T07:06:24Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/8148-
dc.description.abstractAre dreams subjective experiences during sleep? Is it like something to dream, or is it only like something to remember dreams after awakening? Specifically, can dream reports be trusted to reveal what it is like to dream, and should they count as evidence for saying that dreams are conscious experiences at all? The goal of this article is to investigate the relationship between dreaming, dream reporting and subjective experience during sleep. I discuss different variants of philosophical skepticism about dream reporting and argue that they all fail. Consequently, skeptical doubts about the trustworthiness of dream reports are misguided, and for systematic reasons. I suggest an alternative, anti-skeptical account of the trustworthiness of dream reports. On this view, dream reports, when gathered under ideal reporting conditions and according to the principle of temporal proximity, are trustworthy (or transparent) with respect to conscious experience during sleep. The transparency assumption has the status of a methodologically necessary default assumption and is theoretically justified because it provides the best explanation of dream reporting. At the same time, it inherits important insights from the discussed variants of skepticism about dream reporting, suggesting that the careful consideration of these skeptical arguments ultimately leads to a positive account of why and under which conditions dream reports can and should be trusted. In this way, moderate distrust can be fruitfully combined with anti-skepticism about dream reporting. Several perspectives for future dream research and for the comparative study of dreaming and waking experience are suggested.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipDFG, Open Access-Publizieren Universität Mainz / Universitätsmedizinde
dc.language.isoengde
dc.rightsCC BY*
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/*
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleReporting dream experience : why (not) to be skeptical about dream reportsen_GB
dc.typeZeitschriftenaufsatzde
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-8133-
jgu.type.dinitypearticleen_GB
jgu.type.versionPublished versionde
jgu.type.resourceTextde
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologiede
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.journal.titleFrontiers in human neurosciencede
jgu.journal.volume7de
jgu.pages.start1de
jgu.pages.end15de
jgu.publisher.year2013-
jgu.publisher.nameFrontiers Research Foundationde
jgu.publisher.placeLausannede
jgu.publisher.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00708de
jgu.publisher.issn1662-5161de
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100de
opus.date.modified2018-08-02T09:46:25Z-
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000-
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid24624-
opus.institute.number0508-
opus.metadataonlyfalse-
opus.type.contenttypeElektronische Ressourcede_DE
opus.type.contenttypeElectronic Resourceen_EN
opus.affiliatedWindt, Jennifer M.-
jgu.publisher.doi10.3389/fnhum.2013.00708de
jgu.organisation.rorhttps://ror.org/023b0x485-
Appears in collections:DFG-OA-Publizieren (2012 - 2017)

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