Contested Cooperation in the EU's External Migration Policy: In Search of Effective Migration Partnerships (with Niger and Mali)
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Abstract
In view of the increasing importance of the EU's external migration policy, this study examines the latter's effectiveness using the example of the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF), which was adopted in 2016 with the main aim of restricting irregular immigration to Europe and increasing return quotas through close cooperation with selected third countries. Building on previous studies on strategic migration policy, the thesis derives four central hypotheses from the negotiation analysis literature in conjunction with studies on the complex of 'internal cohesiveness - external effectiveness' to explain the emergence of such forms of cooperation. These hypotheses are confirmed by a structured focused comparison of the contrasting cases of Niger and Mali: According to this, third countries are considering cooperation based on the relationship between advantages/the degree of alignment with national priorities and the costs incurred, which may outweigh possible incentives, especially if domestic political resistance is mobilised and there is a lack of compensation offers to affected interest groups. Accordingly, the core interests of the negotiating partners must be compatible, i.e. the cost-benefit ratio on the part of the third country must exceed its best alternative option, and the offer of cooperation must be within the limits of the maximum offer the EU is willing or able to grant.
In practice, this is often not the case, especially in countries of origin such as Mali, where there is a strong interest in migration. Even a maximum increase in the EU offer through policy mainstreaming and the prevention of alternative coalitions via close integration of EU member states often seem insufficient to compensate for the disadvantages of the respective third country. In practice, this constellation, however, caused the MPF to not only miss its original target (restricting immigration to Europe) and its internal objectives (joint implementation of control and return measures with third countries), thus resulting in limited effectiveness, it also incurred high costs both of a material and strategic nature and by jeopardising other foreign policy objectives and standards as well as imposing opportunity costs due to the untapped migration potential. Paradoxically, a central means of resolving the resistance of strategic third countries lies in opening legal migration channels, which would, however, fundamentally contradict the EU's domestic policy intention of restricting immigration and would require a widespread change in attitudes. Consequently, an overall effective EU migration policy requires both a shift in the EU's reservation point and a fundamental understanding of the respective partner interests.