Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-450
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dc.contributor.authorWiese, Wanja
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-14T08:43:53Z
dc.date.available2016-11-14T09:43:53Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/452-
dc.description.abstractAnil Seth’s target paper connects the framework of PP (predictive processing) and the FEP (free-energy principle) to cybernetic principles. Exploiting an analogy to theory of science, Seth draws a distinction between three types of active inference. The first type involves confirmatory hypothesis-testing. The other types involve seeking disconfirming and disambiguating evidence, respectively. Furthermore, Seth applies PP to various fascinating phenomena, including perceptual presence. In this commentary, I explore how far we can take the analogy between explanation in perception and explanation in science. in the first part, i draw a slightly broader analogy between pp and concepts in theory of science, by asking whether the bayesian brain is kuhnian or popperian. while many aspects of pp are in line with karl popper’s falsificationism, other aspects of pp conform to how thomas kuhn described scientific revolutions. thus, there is both a sense in which the bayesian brain is kuhnian, and a sense in which it is popperian. the upshot of these considerations is that falsification in pp can take many different forms. in particular, active inference can be used to falsify a model in more ways than identified by seth. in the second part of this commentary, i focus on seth’s ppsmct (predictive processing account of sensorimotor contingency theory) and its application to perceptual presence, which assigns a crucial role to counterfactual richness. in my discussion, i question the significance of counterfactual richness for perceptual presence. first, i highlight an ambiguity inherent in seth’s descriptions of the target phenomenon (perceptual presence vs. objecthood). then i suggest that counterfactual richness may not be the crucial underlying feature (of either perceptual presence or objecthood). giving a series of examples, i argue that the degree of represented causal integration is an equally good candidate for accounting for perceptual presence (or objecthood), although more work needs to be done.en_GB
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsInCopyrightde_DE
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titlePerceptual presence in the Kuhnian-Popperian Bayesian brain : a commentary on Anil K. Sethen_GB
dc.typeBuchbeitragde_DE
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551737
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-450-
jgu.type.dinitypebookPart
jgu.type.versionPublished versionen_GB
jgu.type.resourceText
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologie-
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.book.titleOpen MIND
jgu.book.editorMetzinger, Thomas
jgu.pages.alternativeKap. 35(C)
jgu.publisher.year2015
jgu.publisher.nameMIND Group
jgu.publisher.placeFrankfurt am Main
jgu.publisher.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570207
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100
opus.date.accessioned2016-11-14T08:43:53Z
opus.date.modified2016-11-14T08:44:59Z
opus.date.available2016-11-14T09:43:53
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid55173
opus.relation.ispartofcollectionOpen Mindde_DE
opus.institute.number0508
opus.metadataonlyfalse
opus.type.contenttypeKeinede_DE
opus.type.contenttypeNoneen_GB
opus.affiliatedWiese, Wanja
jgu.publisher.doi10.15502/9783958570207
jgu.organisation.rorhttps://ror.org/023b0x485
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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