Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-443
Authors: Gerrans, Philip
Title: Metamisery and bodily inexistence : a reply to Ying-Tung Lin
Online publication date: 11-Nov-2016
Language: english
Abstract: The difference between the Cotard Depersonalisation and Depersonalisation Disorder may consist, not only in the fact that the Cotard delusion is a response  to prediction error affective/bodily information, but the level in the predictive processing hierarchy at which predictions about bodily information are violated.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-443
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551599
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: in Copyright
Information on rights of use: https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation: Open MIND
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: Kap. 15(R)
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2015
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570924
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958570924
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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