Authors:	Proust, Joëlle
Title:	The representational structure of feelings
Online publication date:	30-Nov-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	The word “feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive embodied phenomenal quality. Several types of feelings are usually distinguished, such as bodily, agentive, affective, and metacognitive feelings. The hypothesis developed in this article is that all feelings are represented in a specialized, non-conceptual “expressive” mode, whose function is evaluative and action-guiding. Feelings, it is claimed, are conceptually impenetrable. Against a two-factor theory of feelings, it is argued, in the cases of affective and metacognitive feelings, that background beliefs can circumvent feelings in gaining the control of action, but cannot fully suppress them or their motivational potential.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-77
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-553259
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 31(T)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570047
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958570047
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen